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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
DEFENSES AGAINST A HOLDER IN DUE
COURSE
How far can the maker of a negotiable instrument go in
attacking its illegality in the hands of a transferee, by reason
of (a) nondelivery, (b) fraud, (c) illegality?
The question of the right of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument which has been stolen is commencing to
come up in trial courts very frequently of late because of two
peculiar circumstances. The activities of a great number of so-
called investment courses dealing in commercial paper and trade
acceptances obtaining negotiable instruments by fraud and even
by theft and due to the fact of the so-called "liquor ring"
having dealt in paper to cover whisky transactions. The public
and banks in particular, have been flooded with instruments on
which payment has been refused when presented and to which,
on suit being brought, defences ranging from nondelivery to
illegality and fraud in the inception have been interposed.
Although the precise question of the right to recover on a
bill or note stolen before delivery is not a novel one, it is sub-
mitted by way of apology that on account of the increasing fre-
quency of combinations of circumstances such as indicated above
a re-examination and re-statement of the elementary propositions
of law involved in this question might be pertinent at this time.
A promissory note is, of course, a chose in. action. It is a
mercantile chose. At Common Law there was, of course, a
policy against the alienability of choses in action, and choses in
action were divided in (i) parol choses and (2) specialty and
mercantile choses. Strictly, at Common Law the mercantile .chose
which was a sealed instrument had no more particular dignity
than a parol chose but later, by the custom of merchants, it
attained a dignity equal to the specialty chose. The history of
the development of the right to transfer specialty choses and
later on the development of the doctrine of the right to transfer
mercantile choses, is very interesting and occupies a very promi-
nent place in the history of the Common Law. The real reason
for the doctrine of the inalienability of choses in action was not,
in reality, the objection of maintenance but was with reference
to the idea of a debt, "that the credit being the personal right
of the creditor, the debtor, being obliged toward that person
could not by a transfer of the credit which was not an act of
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his, become obliged toward another";' or as Ames expressed it,
"A chose in action always presupposes a personal relation be-
tween two individuals. But a personal relation in the very nature
of things cannot be assigned. Even a relation between a person
and a physical thing in his possession as already stated cannot
be transferred. The thing itself may be transferred, and, by con-
sent of the parties to such transfer, the relation between the
transferor and the thing may be destroyed and replaced by a
new but similar relation between the transferee and the res.
But where one has a mere right against another there is nothing
that is capable of being transferred. 2
In the time of Coke a specialty chose which evidenced an
obligation could be transferred but it was considered that it was
not the chose that was transferred but merely the paper which
evidenced a chose.3 "It is implied that if a man hath an obliga-
tion though he cannot grant the thing in action yet he may
give or grant the deed, viz., the parchment to another who may
cancel and use the same at his pleasure." This distinction was
carried out in England as late as 1876, and the usual way in
which a chose in action was attempted to be transferred was by
the giving of the thing which evidenced the debt to another,
coupled with a power of attorney in the name and place of that
other to enforce the chose. The custom of merchants whereby
a foreign bill of exchange could be assigned by the payee to a
third person making that third person the legal owner of the
bill as well as the equitable owner was recognized in England
by the law courts as early as the I4th century and in the 17th
century the same custom with reference to an inland bill as re-
gards its transferability was recognized.4 Promissory notes were
put upon the footing of inland bills by the statutes of 7 Anne.
The Common Law theory, apart from considerations of pro-
cedure, looked even with mercantile choses to the title to the
paper. Even when, by the passage of the Judicature Act and
by the statutes in various states, the real party in interest or the
assignee of a claim was allowed to sue in his own name, all
defences available against the assignor before notice of the as-
signment of the debt were destroyed.
'2 Spence: Eq. Jur., 850; See also Polock, Contracts, 5th ed. 206;
Holmes Common Law, 340-341; Maitland, 2 Law Quarterly Review, 495.
'Select Essays on Anglo-American History, Vol. III, page 58o.
'Fol. 232 b 377 cited in Farrell. The Passaic Water Co., 82 N. J. 97.
'Clut. Bells Section IO.
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The necessities of trade and commerce and the custom of
merchants built up a doctrine of negotiation as opposed to assign-
ment. The fundamental policy of the Common Law in reference
to title, not only true as to real, but to chattels and to specialty
choses in action was, that a wrongdoer could pass no title, and
a transferee under the common law theory could never obtain
better title to a thing than that of his transferor. The custom
of merchants, however, and the theory of mercantile usages
was to protect a purchaser for value and in good faith in the
usual and ordinary course of business. In the gradual growth
of importance of commercial transactions and in the growth of
trading there came to be a clash between the common law theory
and the mercantile theory. The custom of merchants was recog-
nized by the English Law Courts and the theory of negotiation as
opposed to assignability became recognized and that theory has
been adopted in the present negotiable instrument law. Under
the theory of negotiation a transferee of commercial paper obtains,
if he is a bona fide purchaser in due course and before maturity
and for value, a fresh title not dependent on the title of his
transferor even if such title were defective unless he knew of
the defect or unless the title of his transferor was absolutely
void. Still, however, even under that theory, the title to the
instrument itself had to be acquired. It would be impossible to
constitute a transferee an owner of a negotiable instrument which
would not exist as an instrument unless it were delivered inten-
tionally.
What then is the situation where a negotiable instrument is
executed and stolen before delivery? In general there is no
contract completed and there is not title in the payee because
of no delivery. Suppose, however, that after the payee has
stolen it or, while in the hands of the payee and indorsed by
him it were stolen, that it reached a bona fide purchaser for
value, where is the title to the instrument? In this country prior
to the passage of the negotiable instrument act there were two
lines of authority, one line of authority5 holding that a bona fide
holder is entitled to recover under such circumstances. The
reason for such holding does not clearly appear in some cases,
being put on the theory of negligence in letting the paper get
out of one's possession although there is not any particular
quantum of evidence demanded to prove negligence; and another
"Mass., Tex., Minw. III., and La.
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theory which it is submitted is really the theory, that in the
interests of society and business generally it is better to protect
the bona fide purchaser than the unfortunate maker. This theory
does not seem logical because the ordinary doctrine of equity is
that "where the equities are equal the legal title prevails" and
there is no title in the bona fide holder even in the paper; because
delivery is essential to give the instrumental legal existence.
The other line of authority previous to the negotiable instru-
ments act was that the bona fide holder could not have title,
the theory being either that delivery was necessary or that a
purchaser from a thief was not a bona fide holder. There are
dicta in accordance with this view expressed in Andrews v.
Thayer,6 and the question with this view was squarely decided
in line with this authority in Roberts v. McGrathT and Dodd v.
Dunne." In that case (Dodd y. Dunne) on the question of whether
there had been delivery and no negligence, the Supreme Court
held that there could not be recovery even by a bona fide
holder.
Under the negotiable instrument act it is provided that an
instrument is negotiable by delivery if payable to bearer; if
payable to order, by the indorsement of the holder completed
by delivery.9 And in a notation to this section in the pamphlet
annoted negotiable instrument law published under authority of
the Secretary of State and which until recently was obtainable,
the statement is made, "A valid delivery is absolutely necessary
even against a holder, otherwise in due course." That this is
not true would seem apparent by a reading of Section 1675-16,
part of which reads, "but where the instrument is in the hands
of the holder in due course, a valid delivery by all parties prior
to him so as to make them liable to him is CONCLUSIVELY
presumed." And see section 1676-28 "in the hands of any
holder OTHER than a holder in due course a negotiable instru-
ment is subject to the same defences as if it were negotiable"
which under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius and
read with the section 1676-16, would indicate, it is submitted,
a legislative intent to change the Wisconsin rule.
In the case of Hodge v. Smith 10 the question before the court
030 Wisconsin 228.
038 Wisconsin 52.
'1I Wisconsin 578.
'See section 1676, Wisconsin Statutes.
1i3o Wisconsin 326.
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was the effect of conditional delivery as between the parties,
and the rights of a bona fide purchaser where not directly before
the court as to this question of delivery. The court said, however,
on page 333, "the authorities are not all in harmony with the
foregoing. Dodd v. Dunne" is an example, but. by the negotiable
instrument law'2 the principle thereof was incorporated into the
written rules of this state in these words,"... , quoting the
section. The learned justice (Marshall) assuming that this sec-
tion had changed the rule as expressed in Dodd v. Dunne, it would
seem that in Wisconsin under the negotiable instrument act as
passed by our legislature, the fact of delivery or nondelivery in
the hands of a bona fide purchaser is not available as a defense
against him. That delivery is essential would seem to be recog-
nized by the introduction of the fiction which finds it necessary
to deem it "conclusively presumed" but whether delivery existed
in fact, in the hands of a holder in due course, it is submitted
is now immaterial. It is not the purpose of this summary to
define what constitutes a holder in due course. Assuming, how-
ever, that one is a holder in due course of an instrument stolen,
or negotiated through fraud, or originally given for an illegal
purpose it is submitted that nondelivery is not a defence.
The act provides "that absence or failure of consideration is
a matter of defence as against any person NOT A HOLDER
IN DUE COURSE"' 3 so under the familiar rule of construction
it would be no defence in the hands of a holder in due course.
It is elsewhere provided (1676-25 Wisconsin Statutes) "the
title of such person (who negotiates an instrument) is absolutely
void when such instrument or signature was so procured from
a person who did not know the nature of the instrument and
could not have obtained such knowledge by the use of ordinary
care." It is the settled rule in Wisconsin that if the maker's
signature is procured by false representations as to the character
of the paper, he being ignorant of the true character and being
not negligent in being so ignorant, that the paper is void in
the hands of a bona fide purchaser.
It is likewise the settled rule in Wisconsin established by the
earliest decision in this state that illegality will not defeat an
n"i Wisconsin 578.
"1i675-x6 Chapter 356, Laws of z899.
ni674-54 Wisconsin Statutes.
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action upon a note by a holder in due course having no notice
of the defect."4
In reference to forgery the act itself provides that where a
signature is forged or made without the authority of the person
whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative unless
the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is pre-
cluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. 5
Therefore, it is submitted, that the only defence against a
holder in due course of a stolen note or one obtained through
an illegal or fraudulent transaction, is absolutely forgery or such
fraud which establishes that the maker did not know the nature
of the instrument which he signed and could not have obtained
such knowledge by the use of ordinary care.
In other words a negotiable instrument has two necessary
formal requisites, one execution and the other delivery. Under
the present state of the law in Wisconsin it is submitted that
in the hands a holder in due course the only advantage that can
be taken of the absence of the formal requisites is of that which
deals with its execution and no advantage can be taken of the
absence of that requisite which deals with its delivery.
'I Wisconsin 378.i675-23.
